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Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
I  am  honoured  to have  been  asked  to give  this 
year's  Paul-Henri  Spaak  lecture;  honoured 
because  for  me  the  American  East Coast and 
particularly the Boston  area/Harvard has  always 
symbolised constructive  re:lection on  European-
United States  relations,  honoured also because 
we  live in a  period  in which  Western  Europe's 
children are  in desperate  need  of  the  Paul-Henri 
Spaak  kind  of  "fathers of  Europe••. 
Along  with  such an  honour  comes  some  embarrassment. 
What  message  can  I  bring  i~  these weeks  and 
months  of  crisis over  East-West 
relations,  over  European-United States  relations 
and,  at least until  the  European  summit  in 
Athens  in  December,  over European  unification 
itself?  In  the words  of  Leo  Tindemans,  one  of 
Paul-Henri  Spaak's  successors  as  Belgian  foreign 
minister,  in  a  letter about  the  forthcoming  Athens 
summit  which  he  sent to Christian Democrat 
party leaders  on  1st September,  1983,  "I cannot 
over-emphasise the  seriousness of  the situation. 
we  are,  in fact,  confronted with  the most 
difficult decisions  since  the  launching  of  the PARLIMENT  EUROP!EN 
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Schuman  plan  in  1950.  We  will  now  have  to see 
whether  we  remain  faithful  to our doctrine  and 
our  prograrrune
11
• 
"It should  no  longer be  the  case  that peo9les 
are asked to commit  themselves  to more  than  they 
can  psychologically accept  and  psychologically 
give
11
,  Spaak  said  in  1936  in his  first  speech 
as  the  socialist foreign  minister of  Belgium. 
He  continued:  "one must  leave  aside grand 
resolutions  which  are  not  applied,  and  replace 
them  with  a  strong will  to  apply  more  completely 
those  which  are much  closer  to reality.'' 
The  "grand  resolutions"  concerning  the 
construction  of  Western  Europe  have  already 
been  put  on  Qne  side for  more  than  ten  years. 
And  the  "strong will  to apply  more  completely 
those  which  are much  closer to reality"  is still 
lacking.  Even  now,  at a  time  when  economists 
have  shown  that European  solutions  to our 
economic  difficulties provide  the most  effective 
way  out of  the crisis, political leaders are 
reluctant to accept their advice,  and  the 
qovernments  of  the Community's  ten  Member  states, 
plagued  by  economic  and  financial  problems,  seem 
to prefer Europe's  way  to under-development. c< 
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The  European  crisis will affect,  and  has  already 
affected,  the  Europe-United States relationship; 
a  relationship which  could 
be described as 
11drifting  apart together". 
Neither  the durability nor  the  need  for  continuity 
in  the  relationship between  us  can  seriously be 
called into question.  But  things have  changed  a 
great deal  since General  Marshall  launched  the 
idea  for  a  programme  for  European  recovery,  here 
in  this very university,  in  June  1947.  That  in 
1983."economic  recovery"  should  be  discussed 
once  again  has  a  lot to  do  with  the  fact  that 
European  financial  resources,  which  are urgently 
needed  for  industrial  investment,  are instead 
directed  towards  the  American  capital market. 
The  European crisis must  be  seen  in  the  light  of 
the crisis of  self-confidence we  have  experienced 
since  the  Yom  Kippur war.  We  were  unable  to 
come  to terms  with  the  sudden halt in  economic 
growth  which  resulted from  the first oil  shock. 
We  were  caught off guard,  and it took  yet another 
oil  shock  before we  started the necessary  reform 
of  our  economic  and  budgetary policies.  The PAAt.EMENT EUAOPhN 
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crisis started at the very  time  that  a  kind  of 
new  nationalism was  setting in:- Mrs.  Thatcher 
wants  her money  back  because  that is the  way  to 
show  that!£!, while  a  member  of  the community, 
does  not neglect the  very  immediate national 
interests;  Mr.  Mitterrand,  in passing all 
Japanese video  recorders  through  the  somewhat 
out of  the way  city of  Poitiers,  demonstrates 
that he  is a  good  European  because  he  protects 
the  interests of  a  non-competitive  industry  so 
•..Jell.  If we  follo•·r  that path,  national 
policies will  prevail  - the  European  Community, 
i~ political  terms  will  find it increasingly 
difficult to operate. 
But,  we  all realise that,  9iven  the  scale  of 
the problems  we  face,  it is no  longer possible 
to  overcome  our difficulties without concerted 
international action.  The  politicians know 
that the  community  is their best 
instrument for stimulating  such  action -
particularly in  relation to the  United States. - ----------------------------
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It is therefore essential  that we  do all we  can 
to establish a  more  orderly way  of  managing  our 
trade  relations if we  are all to  prosper.  We 
must also  remember  that,  as  relatively wealthy 
nations,  we  have  a  responsibility  to  ensure  that 
the weakest countries,  the  countries  of  the  Third 
World,  benefit  from  our co-operation  and  economic 
progress.  If  we  do  not  show  ourselves  to  be 
open  and generous  towards  them,  then·we will not 
just be  overseeing  their economic  decli~e,  we 
shall be  presiding  oYer  their ruin. 
So  now  we  have  to set our Atlantic house  in 
order.  Let us reflect on  the current situation. 
Both  Europe  and  the United States clearly have 
important basic similarities.  For example, 
the North  Atlantic  society is a  democratic  one, 
we  believe  in  human  rights  and civil liberties, 
even  if our  fight for  them  abroad  is  sometimes 
rather eclectic.  Where  Europe worries about  the 
human  rights  situation in  Turkey  or Central 
America,  the  United States  seems  to care rather 
less1  in the Middle  East,  many  Europeans 
sometimes  tend to forget  the democratic  nature PAFU.EMENT  IUROP!EN 
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of Israeli society.  But where  we  really are  in 
trouble  is  on  the  economic  front,  in  the  industrial 
s•ctor,  in the agricultural  field and  in  the 
area  of  security. 
On  both  sides of  the 
the Atlantic  we  are  experiencing  considerable 
difficulties  in  the  readjustment  process  in 
certain  ~raditional industrial  sectors,  such  as 
steel  and  textiles.  In addition,  high  levels  of 
unemployment  - yours  are going  down  slightly, 
ours  are  rising further  from  the current level 
of  10.5%  - help  to create  increasing  strains, 
both  internally and  in our  external  relations. 
Moreoever,  notwithstanding all our anti-
protectionist declarations,  I  have  the  impression 
that protectionism is in fact on  the  increase, 
perhaps a  little more  in  the  United  states than 
in  Europe.  The  difference is easily explained: 
the  European  economy  is far more  dependent  on 
world trade  than  the  US  economy.  Our  main 
"battlefields" are  steel  and  textiles - as  I  have 
already indicated - although agriculture may  well 
overshadow these  two quite  soon. ( 
1. 
Lately,  in  Europe,  we  have  been  particularly 
alarmed  by  many  Congressional  initiatives which 
have  advocated protectionist courses  of  action. 
By  the  end of last year,  thanks  to  the efforts 
of  Secretary  Shultz,  many  problems  were  overcome 
after long  discussions,  But  old habits die 
hard  - and  once  again  we  find  ourselves 
confronting  each  other with  threats  over 
special  steels and agricultural exports  to 
third countries.  The  EC  has  been  forced  to  act 
on  one  issue at least,  and  an  anoeal  has  been  .... 
~ade to  GATT  concerning  US  import  restrictions  on 
special steels  (in  accord~~ce with Article  19) 
and  negotiations  are still  continuin~·LNot only 
t~~t,  new  differences,  over  the  limitation of 
the  US  export of cereal substitutes,  over Euro-
pean  wine  exports,  over slab steel,  now  loom 
on  the  hnri?.nn~7 
The  current dispute with  the United States  places 
in  jeopardy much  of what has  already  been 
achieved  in  the field of  European  agreement on 
the restructuring of  the  steel  industry. 
With  the  European  steel  industry  suffering 
enormous  job losses  in the last few  years  and 
the dramatic  decline  in  steel production,  it PARLEMENT  EUROPiEN 
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is not difficult to foresee  that a  dispute with 
the  United States on  special  steels could 
easily develop  into a  new  internal steel crisis 
within  the European  Community. 
Agricultural  trade disputes are another difficult 
issue - it could easily become  a  still more 
emotive  one  in  the  run-up  to  the  European 
elections in  June  1984  and  the American 
presidential elections.  It is possible that 
at the European  summit  in Athens  in  December, 
agreement  on  the  reform of  the Common 
Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  will only be  achieved 
if the Community  decides  to negotiate an 
agreement with  the United States  on  limitations 
to us  exports  of cereal  substitutes to  the 
European Community,  whilst  in  the  United 
States,  I  believe,  pressure is growing  to 
limit the  imports of French  and  Italian wines 
and  already we  are  fighting  each  other 
for better shares  in  a  world market which  is 
increasingly becoming  a  market without any 
buyers.  The  competing  subsidies  for  the Egyptian 
flour market  is only one  example.  The  struggle 
over  a  declining market  in the Gulf  area is 
another one. PAALEM!NT EUROPCEN 
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Our  economic  difficulties are frequently 
attributed  to rises  in oil prices.  Without 
wishing  to minimise  the effects  of  the oil 
shocks  on  the world  econornv,  it was  already 
apparent  in  the  early  1970s  that the  Western 
economy  was  heading  for  a  ?eriod of  considerable 
difficulty.  The  US  decision  to  transform  the 
dollar into a  free,  floating currency  only 
worsened matters. 
We  are living  in  a  period  of great monetary 
instability:  real  interest rates are  too  high 
and  there is a  nearly unsurmountable  world  debt 
problem,  made  even  more difficult by  the 
reluctance  of  the  us  Congress  to increase 
American  participation in  the  International 
Monetary  Fund. 
There  are  no  signs  of  an  early  agreement  on  a 
more  orderly basis for  the  international 
monetary  system.  As  long  as  such  disorder 
remains,  any  hope  of  r~.ally coming  to  tel:ms  with 
our trade  and  commercial  problems will be  vain. 
Even  the prudent  recommendations  made  at the 
much-heralded Williamsburg  summit  seem to have 
been  forgotten. F:.-.  \2·  .. ·. 
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The  international  monetary  house  is not  in 
order,  and  in  Europe  we  still have  a  long 
way  to go  before  the  European  Monetary 
System  is worthy  of  that  ~arne.  Even  if the 
European  currency unit,  the  ECU,  is playing 
an  increasi.ngly  i:rr.portan t  role  in capital 
markets,  as  long  as  the  United  Kingdom 
remai~s outside  the  EMS,  it will  be 
impossible  to create  the  ~ecessary monetary 
enviro~~nt which will  e~able ~e  ECU  to play a  =eal 
role  in  international  monetary  relatio~s. 
I  am  glad to  say  t~at there  is  some  prcgress 
in this direction  - an  increasing  number  of 
economists  and  politicians are  advocat:.::g 
the  participation  of  the  United  Kingdo~ in 
the  EMS.  Britain's participation would  be 
an  important  step along  the  road  to  the 
creation of a  European  Community  body  on  the 
lines of  a  central bank,  which  would  be 
responsible for  monetary  policy  and  for  the 
creation of  a  convertible currency.  Such  a 
currency  would considerably diminish  the 
burden  which  the  EMS  places  on  the neutsch 
Mark  at the moment  and would  create a (
,_._ 
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counter-weight  to  the dollar.  A greater 
degree  of  convergence between  the  economies 
of  the Member  States is an  essential condition 
for  such  a  develop~e~t.  Progress  in  this 
direction has  already  been  made,  as  shown  by 
the fact  t~at our  inflatio~ rates are  now 
being  reduced. 
A  stronger and  more  stable  EMS  would  help us  to 
make  better  use  o: the  fi~ancial 
reserves  - of  which  we  hold about one-third, 
and  of  the world's gold  reserves- 50%  of 
which  are  in  our  banks. 
A more  stable and  predictable  international 
exchange  rate mechanism will  bring  with it 
considerable advantages  to the  industrialised 
world.  Investment decisions will be  taken  in 
a  more  secure  international financial 
environment and better medium  and  long  term 
planning will  be achieved.  This  is particularly 
relevant if we  are  to devote  adequate  resources 
to  the very  costly  process of  the development 
of  new  technology.  It will also  gen~rate an 
improved political climate because one  of  the ------~------
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main  obstacles  to an  even  closer transatlantic 
understanding  will  have  been  removed. 
Of  equal  importance  is the  effect that  such  an 
agreement would  have  on  the  growing  number  of 
Third World  debtor countries. 
The  repayment  proble~s of  many  Third World 
countries are directly related  to  the high 
US  interest rates.  We  cannot change  that 
interest rate  from  one  day  to  the  next.  But  that 
only  increases  the  need  for  international 
co-operation  to  provide  adequate official 
development assistance  to  low  income 
countries.  The  IMF  report  for  1983  clearly 
spells that out.  Similarly,  the  53rd Annual 
Report of  the  Bank  of  International 
Settlements underlined  the  interdependence 
between  the  situation  in  Western  industrialised 
countries and  the difficulties experienced 
by  a  large  number  of  developing  countries 
to  service their foreign debts.  Those 
difficulties - and  I  still refer to the BIS 
report - very often have,  as  their background, 
the  high  US  interest rates. ,:,, 
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I  know  that many  European countries,  because 
of  sizeable budgetary deficits,  also 
contribute to  the maintenance  of rather high 
real  interest rates.  But  that problem is 
a  minor  one  compared  to  the  problem of 
dollar-related rates,  and,  I  would  add,  the 
attraction  the us  interest rates have for 
European capital  investors. 
I  did not  intend to go  into  so much  economic 
detail.  I  only wanted  to  indicate that 
steel,  chemicals,  soja beans,  corn gluten, 
world dairy and  cereal markets and  last but 
not least,  the real  interest rates of  the 
dollar,  have  a  very direct impact  on  us-
Europe  relations.  So  far  they  have not been 
a  mobilising  factor  for  public opinion.  The 
turkey war,  of,  I  believe,  a  decade  or  so  ago, 
was  more  impressive  from  that point of  view, C 
.. 
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But  the  seemingly  impossible  can eventually 
happen.  As  we  have  discovered,  it does  not  take 
very much  to create serious  problems.  Let  me 
give you  one more  recent exarople  :  "The vlashington Post" 
leak on  the effect of the neutron bomb  on  human 
beings  and its P,roperty-saving  side effects did 
more  to  undermine  us-Europe  relations  than 
any  other measure  taken by  the  US  Administration 
so  far. 
"Drifting apart  together"  was  my  description 
of  US-Europe  relations at the beginning  of 
my  speech.  Before  that remark,I  said  something 
positive about East coast intellectuals, 
I  would  add,  however,  that  I  have  serious 
doubts  as  to whether  the East Coast still has 
that very real effect on  US  policy, 
Both  European  and  American  society has  changed 
considerably  since  the birth of  the Atlantic 
Alliance,  and political leaders on  both  sides 
of  the Atlantic have  become  far more  inward-
looking.  Domestic  reaction and  public opinion 
form  an  increasingly important background to our 
foreign  policy attitudes.  That is as true for 
the  US  as it is for  Europe.  I  will limit my 
observations  to the latter. 
l~lm 
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The  recent demonstrations  in  Europe against 
eurrent nuclear policy have  become  relevant 
to all politicians  and officials,  no matter 
what  their institutional competence.  The 
nuclear protest movement  has  made  the question 
of  nuclear weapons  an  issue of  popular 
politics and  has  effectively  tra~scended the 
artificial divisions within which  we  deal 
with military,  econo~ic and  political  issues. 
More  than  anything,  it has  demons~rated the 
urgent need  for  the  deployment  of  a  specifically 
European  approach  to security.  An  approach 
t~at can  clearly be  identified with  European 
interests and  expectations.  The  ~ATO IXF 
decision  has highlighted  this  problem  and 
the  decision will  remain  crucial  to  the  future 
evolution of  the  form  and  direction of 
Western  security policy. PARLEMENT !UROPe!N 
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It now  s~s  a  real possibility that in spite of 
the efforts of  the peace movement  and  the 
negotiators  in Geneva,  Pershing II and ground-
launched cruise missiles will  shortly make 
their long-awaited and  much  debated appearance 
on  European  territory.  For many,  this will  be 
a  moment  of  triumph.  The  Western Alliance 
will  have  passed  a  critical test and will 
have  demonstrated  its ability to  take  and 
sustai~ difficult defence  decisions.  For 
others,  however,  the arrival  of  the  new 
missiles will  confirm their worst  suspicions: 
that the  second  track  of  the  NATO  double 
16. 
track decision  - that of  arms  control  - was 
always  a  convenient cover  for  deployment.  Even 
the  less cynical,  but  as  yet unconvinced,will 
remember  the official arguments  that only  by 
demonstrating  the determination to deploy 
would  a  condition of mutual  and negotiated 
restraint be  achieved.  Yet,  given  the most 
likely Soviet reaction  to  NATO  deployments,  the 
suspension of  negotiations  and  the  deployment 
of  additional  Soviet missiles,  this Alliance 
policy will have  prod~ced no  arms  control 
and additional missiles  on  either side, 
exactly  the opposite of  what  was  promised. 17. 
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This  contradiction can  only  serve  to further 
exacerbate  the anti-nuclear opposition  and 
further  ~eaken public confidence  in Alliance 
security policies.  Rather  than  a  testament  to 
Alliance resolve  and  cohesion,  the  new 
missiles will  be  a  permanentreminder  of 
unfulfilled commitments,  frustrated 
expectations  and  more  significantly,  they  will 
remain highly visible symbols  of  the  lack  of 
consensus  within our  societies  towards  the 
role  of  nuclear weapons. 
Despite  our aversion  to nuclear weapons,  they 
will unfortunately continue  to  be  a  major 
component  in  the arsenals  of  both  super-powers 
and  consequently  a  major  factor  in any  Western 
security policy,  Yet  from  now  on,  nuclear 
decisions will  be  the  subject of  intense 
public  scrutiny  and  the question  of  public 
acceptance of,  and  support for,  nuclear 
policies will be critical.  It is therefore 
imperative  to pursue policies that will 
command  the confidence  of  our publics.  Policies 
that not only  de~er the Soviet  Union  but also, 
in the  words  of Michael  Ho~ard,  reassure our 
public opinion. 18. 
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What  lessons,  then,  in  this respect,  can  be 
drawn  from  the  INF  decision  and  what  are  the 
likely consequences  for  the  future?  Time  does 
not permit me  to  examine  the details of  the 
INF  decision,  but to make  only  certain general 
observations  that  I  believe  should guide  our 
future  requirements. 
Firstly,  in view of  the nature  of  nuclear 
weapons  and  the numbers  ~nd types  available 
to either side,  we  must  avoid  an  excessive 
preoccupation with  imbalances  in certain 
categories of  systems.  Further,  ~e should 
avoid making  our  security policy  dependent 
on  scenarios  that have little to do  with 
political  reality.  For  example,  to 
suggest that the  SS-20  could be  used  for 
any  conceivable political or military 
objective,  except to secure mutual  suicide, 
is to exist in an  unreal  world.  Moreover, 
if a  system  is devoid  of  political 
application,  then it cannot  be  used  for 
political blackmail  or  intimidation and 
suggestions  to this effect are nonsense. PARLEMENT  EUROP!EN 
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In  moving  towards  a  more  rational  policy 
for nuclear weapons,  we  must  urge  the 
elimination of all short  range  systems  in 
Europe as  they  contribute little to 
deterrence  and  would  actually be 
destabilising  in a  conflict situation. 
We  must  avoid  imposing  in  the  name  of 
Alliance solidarity,  decisions  which 
undermine  or weaken  national  support  for 
the Alliance  and  for  security policy  in 
general.  We  should accept  that the very 
diversity  of  the Alliance - which  is  its 
strength  - runs  counter  to attempts  to 
impose  such  cohesion. 
We  must  avoid linking  arms  control  and 
modernisation  in  such  a  way  that they 
become  dependent  on  each  other. 
19. (
,. 
" 
·~--- ·------·· 
PAAUMENT  EUROPI!EN 
CABINET  OU  PReSIDENT 
These general  observations apart,  the most 
striking consequence  of  the  INF  de~ision is 
20· 
the  need  for  Europeans  to begin  to  think 
clearly and  coherently  about  their own  security 
requirements.  What  sorts of  security 
relationships they  require with  the  US,  what 
sort of  nuclear guarantee  and  what  sort of 
coupli~g?  As  it was  European  concern  and 
agitation that created  the initial impetus 
for  I~F modernisation,  this  proposal  may  seem 
somewhat  ironic.  However,  while  European 
involvement  in  the  initial decision  cannot  be 
disputed,  things  have  changed  somewhat  since 
that period.  Both  the  strategic and  political 
environments  in  which  the  initial decision  was 
taken have  altered  substantially,  to the  extent 
that if the  questions  that drove  the  original 
decision were  reconsidered,  then  I  am  sure 
that  the answers  today  would  be  very different. PARLEMENT  EUROP~EN 
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Furthermore,  the perception,  inaccurate  though 
it is,  that the  INF  decision  was  forced  on 
unwilling  Europeans  by  the  US  is  predominant 
within the anti-nuclear movement.  Therefore, 
public  confidence  and  support for  future 
security policies will  depend  on  making  these 
policies clearly  responsive  to  European 
requirements.  The  ~eed :or  Europe  to develop 
a  more  independent  a~proach towards  its 
21. 
security  is not  restricte~ to  the nuclear  field. 
!t has  long  been  apparent that major  differences 
exist between  the  cs  and  its European  allies 
over  a  broad  range  of  issues,  but most 
important,  in  the critical area  of  relations 
with  the Soviet  Union.  The  result of  these 
disputes  has  been  a  growing  scepticism on 
both  sides  of  the Atlantic  towards  the value 
of  Alliance membership.  One  way  in which  the 
Atlantic relationship could be  put on  a  more 
secure  footing  would  be  if Europe  demonstrated 
its willingness  to  take greater responsibility 
for its own  security.  A more  unified European 
approach  could  restore  the mutual  confidence 
and  respect that is essential  if the Atlantic PARLEMENT  EUROP!:EN 
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relationship is  to  survive.  A  more  unified 
approach  could  also help  Europe  to act as  a 
moderating  influence  in  the current stand-off 
between  the  two  super-powers. 
22. 
The  political and  institutional  obstacles  that 
currently  inhibit  such  a  develop~ent are,  of 
course,  formidable,  and  need  no  reiteration 
here.  However,  at the  public  level, 
developments  in  this direction  are already 
discernible.  Indeed,  the  existence of  the 
peace movement  itself represents  the 
determination  that  Eu~opean security policy 
must  respond  to  European  perspectives  and  to 
European  requirements.  Even  within  the 
European  Community  itself,  despite considerable 
opposition,  there are glimrnerings  of  hope, 
as  the  process  known  as  European  Political 
Cooperation gradually intensifies and  it 
extends its scope.  The  European  Parliament 
itself is also playing  an  important role  in 
developing  public consciousness  of  the need 
for  a  European  dimension  to security policies. 
Progress will  inevitably be  slow,  A  series of 
small  steps rather  than  a  dramatic  leap.  But ------------
23. 
PARLEMENT  EUROPiiEN 
CABINET  OU  PR~SlDENT 
it is a  necessary  development.  The  issue 
of  nuclear weapons  apart,  there are many  other 
issues  whose  successful  resolution will  depend 
on  Europeans  making  their views  heard,  and 
above all,  the development  of public  consensus 
on  future  defence  policy will  depend  on  whether 
those who  are  to be  protected can  identify 
with  the  particular policies. c 
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As  I  said before,  however,  this won't  happen 
tomorrow,  although  I  would  repeat that  I  believe 
that the  security link will determine  the 
nature of  US-Europe  relations for  the  foreseeable 
future.  But we  should  be  careful,  The  anti-
nuclear demonstrations  I  talked about  cannot 
be  explained entirely by  the  nuclear  issues 
involved.  There  is also  a  dangerous  degree 
of  anti-Americanism.  President  Reaga~ and 
Secretary  Wei~berger's statements  on  nuclear 
strategy have  only  borne  out  this anti-
Americanism,  and  their  statements  on  nuclear 
war  in  space  and  on  nuclear war  in  Europe 
have  only  fuelled  existing fears. 
I  should like to give  you  an  example  of  this: 
when  I  go  to Strasbourg  once  a  month,  a  nice 
lady  from  the VIP  service at Frankfurt airport 
makes  sure of  my  plane connnections  for  me, 
A  few  months  ago,  I  asked her what  she  thought 
about  the big demonstrations  in Frankfurt 
against the construction of  a  new  runway~ that 
had  strong ecologist party/left wing  overtones. 
She  denounced  the demonstrators but at the PARLEMENT  EUROP~EN 
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same  time  launched a  violent attack  on  the 
Anerican  forces  in Germany  whom  she considered 
to have  corrupted the  German  way  of life and 
created a  consumer  society out of  a  country 
which  had  once more  noble  aspirations. 
I  have  a  feeling  that an  increasing  number  of 
Europeans  feel  uncomfortable  about  the  society 
they  live in,  Certainly  in  Germany,  many 
pa~ple would  like to have  a  rethink  about 
the Atlantic relationship - to  find  a  middle 
way  between  East  and  West.  The  Euromissiles 
debate has had  a  considerable  impact  on  such 
attitudes,  and  only  a  negotiated agreement  in 
Geneva  could help to  overcome this problem. 
At  the  same  time,  American  willingness to 
take  responsibility for  European  security  is 
gradually eroding  the  feeling  in many  European 
countries  - the nuclear P.Owers  excepted - that 
~hey have  a  responsibility for their security 
as  well. C.
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It would,  I  think,  take  too  long  to identify all 
the causes  for  the deep  concern,  which  in 
Europe,  are bringing  so many  people  on  to  the 
streetsin protest.  However,  it seems  to me 
that there  are  two  common  denominators 
- unemployment 
- and  fear  of the  new  nuclear  weapons 
Clearly,  public demonstrations  often have  a 
tendancy  to confuse cause  and  effect.  Also,  it 
has  to be  said that unemployment  and missile 
sites are much  more  identifiable in the public 
mind  than the  causes  of  economic  dissarray  and 
international tension. 
Yet,  for  some  time  now  I  have  been preoccupied 
essentially by  one  thing;  that such  concern 
and  anguish does  not  take root.  The  two  contri-
butory elements  to this are clearly very vital 
threats but we  must  not allow  them to cloud 
our  politica~ horizon. 
At  the beginning of this  speech  I  mentioned 
the Marshall Plan.  I  do  not doubt  that we  in  ttm. 
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Europe  have  the will,  and  we  will find  the 
means,  to bring about  once  again our  economic 
recovery.  It is therefore all the more  impor-
tant that its effects are not  defuzed  by 
protectionist measures  emanating  from  our 
principle ally. 
Therefore,  on both  sides of  the Atlantic we  must 
be quite clear about what constitutes our 
vital interests if we  are to successfully 
prevent their supposed  threat  from  engendering 
widespread  fear  and  concern. 
The  anti-Americanism of  the  Europeans,  and 
the isolationist tendancies  of  Americans 
are dangers  which  can only be  overcome  by 
practicing the mose  adequate  level of  consul-
tation at all levels.  The  greater understanding 
which would result should  allow us,  then,  to 
avoid useless confrontation on  financial, 
commercial  or diplomatic  levels. 
In this way  we  might easily avoid  the nationa-
lism  from which  we  all suffer  - and  create a 
more positive atmosphere within which  our 
indissoluble alliance can prosper. 